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Abstract
The phase randomized light is one of the key assumptions in the security proof of Bennett-
Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol implemented with an attenuated
laser. Though the assumption has been believed to be satisfied for conventional systems, it should
be reexamined for current high speed QKD systems. The phase correlation may be induced by
the overlap of the optical pulses, the interval of which decreases as the clock frequency. The
phase randomness was investigated experimentally by measuring the visibility of interference. An
asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer was used to observe the interference between adjacent
pulses from a gain-switched distributed feedback laser diode driven at 10 GHz. Low visibility was
observed when the minimum drive current was set far below the threshold, while the interference
emerged when the minimum drive current was close to the threshold. Theoretical evaluation on the
impact of the imperfect phase randomization provides target values for the visibility to guarantee
the phase randomness. The experimental and theoretical results show that secure implementation
of decoy BB84 protocol is achievable even for the 10-GHz clock frequency, by using the laser diode
under proper operating conditions.
∗ Present address: Seiko Epson Corporation
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers an unconditionally secure method to share a
cryptographic key between remote parties. Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [1] is
one of the most developed QKD protocols, the security proof of which has been well es-
tablished [2–5]. Recent researches on the security focus on more practical aspects, such as
imperfections in a QKD apparatus. In actual QKD equipment, the device characteristics
deviate from the ideal ones. Keeping the secure key rate with imperfect devices is an im-
portant issue [6, 7]. Since a practical single photon source, assumed in the original BB84
protocol, is still unavailable, most QKD experiments have utilized light pulses from a laser
diode (LD) after strong attenuation. The attenuated laser pulses contain two photons or
more with a finite probability. The multiple photon states opened the way to an efficient
eavesdropping method called photon number splitting (PNS) attack [8]. Gottesman, Lo,
Lu¨tkenhaus, and Preskill (GLLP [9]) analyzed the security against this imperfection. An
improved protocol called decoy-BB84 [10–12] was proposed to yield better secure key rate
than GLLP. The decoy-BB84 protocol provides not only unconditional security with the
attenuated laser light, but also the universal composability [13–16].
The strongly attenuated laser light is often called weak coherent light. This term is
misleading, because the security analysis in the GLLP and decoy-BB84 articles assumes
that the light source emits photons in a phase randomized Poissonian state, which is a
mixture of coherent states with uniformly distributed phases:
ρ =
1
2π
∫ pi
−pi
dφ|αeiφ〉〈αeiφ| = e−|α|2
∞∑
n=0
α2n
n!
|n〉〈n|. (1)
The state is represented by a diagonal density matrix with respect to photon-number basis.
Lo and Preskill [17] showed that, if the photon states were really weak coherent, discrimi-
nation of the bases used in the BB84 protocol would be easier. Recently, Tang, et al. [18]
showed that the phase information also increases distinguishability between decoy and sig-
nal pulses used in the decoy-BB84 protocol. Those reports have issued a warning about the
phase correlation among the laser pulses; the phase correlation will increase the information
leakage and thus reduce the secure key rate. Active phase randomization was proposed and
implemented by Zhao, et al. [19]. Effect of partially randomized phase was also examined
for a plug-and-play system [20].
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Nevertheless, most experimentalists have not taken this warning seriously with a few
exceptions [18–20]. Their common belief is that pulses from a gain-switched LD have no
phase relationship to other pulses. Therefore, the phase of the light source is automatically
randomized, as long as the one-way QKD architecture is employed. The mechanism of the
phase randomization is following. In the gain-switched mode, each current pulse excites
the semiconductor medium from loss to gain. A laser pulse is generated from seed photons
originated from spontaneous emission, because the photons from the previous lasing have
vanished during the pulse interval. The phase of the spontaneous emission is random, so
that the phase of the laser pulses should vary from one pulse to another. This is true
when the previously lased photons disappear completely in the interval. However, if the
photons survive until the next excitation, the lasing can be seeded by the remaining photons.
Then, the phase of the laser pulse may relate to the previous one, because the stimulated
emission conserves the phase. The effect of the residual photons will emerge significantly
by increasing the pulse repetition rate and narrowing the pulse interval. The state-of-art
QKD systems operate at high clock frequencies over 1 GHz, along with the improvement of
the photon detectors [21–23]. The clock frequency would further increase to meet demands
for high bit-rate secure communication. The interval time thus decreases down to hundreds
picoseconds or even shorter. Furthermore, the drive current may not return to zero in
order to improve modulation response of the laser. It is unclear whether the assumption
of the phase randomized source still holds in QKD systems operated at several GHz-clock
frequencies.
In this article, we examine the phase randomness of the light source at 10-GHz clock
frequency. Sec. IIA introduces an asymmetric interferometer set-up to measure the phase
correlation between the adjacent optical pulses. We recall the relation of the phase correla-
tion to the visibility of the interference fringe. Sec. II B considers the effects of the partial
coherence in state discrimination, which were analyzed by Lo-Preskill [17] and Tang et al.
[18] for perfectly coherent states. We provide target values of the visibility, under which we
can regard the light source as phase randomized. Sec. III shows the measured visibility of
the interference fringe of the adjacent pulses from a LD operated at 10-GHz clock frequency.
We controlled DC bias current to the LD, which determines the effective pulse interval and
the minimum drive current. In sec. IV, we examine the accuracy of the estimated values of
visibility, and applied corrections to the estimation. We investigate the relation between the
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observed phase correlation and the operating conditions, in terms of the effective photon life
time of the LDs.
II. THEORY
A. Relation between visibility and phase correlation
The phase relation of laser light can be characterized with an interferometer. Figure
1 illustrates a schematic of an asymmetric interferometer to observe interference between
the adjacent optical pulses. We focus on measuring the interference between the adjacent
pulses, because the phases between the adjacent pulses are more correlated than those be-
tween more temporally-separated pulses. Light pulses generated in the source enter the
asymmetric interferometer, where the delay time is adjusted to the pulse period. The ad-
jacent optical pulses are combined at the output. A phase modulator is placed in one arm
of the interferometer to provide a phase difference ϕ between the paths. The signals are
detected by a high-speed photodetector and accumulated by an averager. If a fixed phase
relation between the adjacent pulses exists, the amplitude of the signal takes a definite value
according to the phase difference between the optical paths. A clear interference fringe will
be observed as ϕ varies. If the phases between the pulses are random, the interference signal
differs from pulse to pulse. Then the interference fringe will disappear after accumulation.
Visibility of interference Θ, which represents the degree of the phase correlation, is defined
by
0 ≤ Θ := Imax − Imin
Imax + Imin
≤ 1, (2)
where Imax and Imin stand for the peak (maximum) and the valley (minimum) of the in-
terference fringe, respectively. As the phase correlation becomes stronger, the visibility gets
closer to one.
In the following, we recall a relation between the visibility and the phase correlation [24].
The output intensity of the interferometer is given by
I(ϕ) ∝ E2 {|aA|2 + |aB|2 + |aAaB| exp [i(θ + ϕ)] + c.c.} , (3)
where the coefficient E = √~ω/2ǫ0V carries the dimension of electric field. The complex
amplitudes aA and aB represent the fields provided from paths A and B, respectively. In
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the asymmetric interferometer, the fields aA and aB correspond to those of the adjacent
pulses. The relative phase between the pulses is given by θ. The third and forth terms of
Eq. (3) are responsible for the interference. Taking an average over an ensemble, we obtain
the interference terms as
〈aAaB〉
〈
eiθ
〉
eiϕ + c.c., (4)
where we assume the phase difference ϕ varies slowly, while the relative phase θ is a prob-
abilistic variable. Equation (4) shows that the interference visibility is governed by the
expectation value of the relative phase 〈eiθ〉. If the distribution of the phase obeys a Gaus-
sian probability density function with the central value θ0 and the standard deviation σ
g(θ, θ0) =
1√
2πσ2
exp
[
−(θ − θ0)
2
2σ2
]
, (5)
the expectation value is given by
〈
eiθ
〉
=
∫ ∞
−∞
eiθg(θ, θ0)d(θ)
= exp
[
−σ
2
2
+ iθ0
]
. (6)
The Gaussian probability distribution describes the phase distribution of the LD light well,
because the light field vector (phaser) in the phase space is kicked by a number of photons
generated by spontaneous emission [25]. The kicks force the field vector to walk randomly
around the original position. Since the spontaneous emission occurs independently, a number
of kicks results in the Gaussian distribution. Using Eqs. (2)-(6), we relate the visibility to
the standard deviation of the phase distribution as
Θ = exp
[
−σ
2
2
]
. (7)
Here, we assume |aA| = |aB| for simplicity. As expected, the visibility decreases rapidly with
increasing the standard deviation of the phase. The analysis given above uses the classical
complex amplitude of the electric field, because the laser field can be well approximated with
a classical field, where the effect of the spontaneous emission is introduced by a random kick
[24, 25]. The wave properties of the field will not be altered by attenuation. Furthermore,
the analysis using quantum operators will provide the similar description.
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FIG. 1. A schematic illustration of a measurement apparatus for the phase correlation between the
adjacent pulses. The delay time of the asymmetric interferometer is adjusted to the pulse period.
The phase difference ϕ between the paths can be modulated.
B. Impact of phase correlation
We consider the impact of phase correlation to provide criteria to guarantee the security
of decoy-BB84 with a LD light source. As stated in the introduction, the phase correlation
enhances the distinguishability of the states, which are expected to be indistinguishable
in the ideal situation [17, 18]. The following calculation will treat two issues on the state
discrimination: one is between the states of different bases, and the other is between the
signal and decoy pulses.
Most security proofs of BB84 rely on the assumption that the density matrix of one basis
is indistinguishable to another. The distingushability of two density matrices, sometimes
called the imbalance of the quantum coin [9], helps the eavesdropper (Eve) to distinguish
the state encoding. GLLP [9] described the imbalance in terms of the fidelity between the
density matrices, and analyzed its effects on the security. Though the imbalance of the
quantum coin often refers to the state preparation flaws, Lo and Preskill [17] showed that
phase correlation also enhances the distingushability. The imbalance of the quantum coin
∆ is given by
∆ =
1− F (ρX , ρZ)
2
, (8)
where the fidelity of the density matrices in X-coding and Z-coding is defined by
F (ρX , ρZ) = Tr
(
ρ
1/2
Z ρXρ
1/2
Z
)1/2
. (9)
Further, since Eve may exploit the channel loss, we should recalculate the imbalance to keep
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security as
∆′ =
∆
ηµ
(10)
for given transmittance of the channel η and the average photon number µ of the source.
Recently, Tamaki, et al. [26] showed that GLLP analysis was too conservative, and proposed
a loss-tolerant proof even with state preparation flaws. We here calculate ∆, because it still
provides a comprehensive measure of the state distinguishability. We can obtain ∆′ from ∆
by Eq. (10), if we follow the GLLP analysis. The density matrices of the partially phase
randomized coherent states are expressed by
ρZ =
1
2
∫ (∣∣√µeiθ〉
F
〈√
µeiθ
∣∣⊗ |0〉S 〈0|+ |0〉F 〈0| ⊗ ∣∣√µeiθ〉S 〈√µeiθ∣∣) g(θ, θ0)dθ
=
1
2
e−µ
(∑
M,N
µ(M+N)/2e−(M−N)
2σ2/2ei(M−N)θ0√
M !N !
|M〉F 〈N | ⊗ |0〉S〈0|
+ |0〉F 〈0| ⊗
∑
M,N
µ(M+N)/2e−(M−N)
2σ2/2ei(M−N)θ0√
M !N !
|M〉S〈N |
)
(11)
ρX =
1
2
∫ (∣∣∣∣
√
µ
2
eiθ
〉
F
〈√
µ
2
eiθ
∣∣∣∣⊗
∣∣∣∣
√
µ
2
eiθ
〉
S
〈√
µ
2
eiθ
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣
√
µ
2
eiθ
〉
F
〈√
µ
2
eiθ
∣∣∣∣⊗
∣∣∣∣−
√
µ
2
eiθ
〉
S
〈
−
√
µ
2
eiθ
∣∣∣∣
)
g(θ, 0)dθ
=
1
2
e−µ
∑
M,N
(µ
2
)(M+N)/2
e−(M−N)
2σ2/2
×
∑
m,n
1 + (−1)m−n√
(M −m)!m!(N − n)!n! |M −m〉F 〈N − n| ⊗ |m〉S〈n|, (12)
where the subscripts F and S denote fast and slow components of the time-bin qubits. A
finite value of θ0 is assumed for Z coding, while it is set to zero for X coding. Since only
the relative phase between the two coding affects the distinguishability, this setting will not
lose generality. The factor exp[−(M −N)2σ2/2] decreases rapidly for large σ, and only the
M = N terms survive. In this phase randomized limit, the density matrices (11) and (12)
coincide with those of the mixture of M-photon number states after the state preparation.
The imbalance of the quantum coin ∆ can be calculated with Eq. (8) and the density
matrices (11) and (12). The two states ρZ and ρX are most distinguishable when the central
value of the phase θ0 = π, and least distinguishable when θ0 = 0. We calculated the
fidelity numerically with the density matrices in the photon-number-state basis truncated
to a finite photon number Nmax. We changed the number of bases to check the accuracy
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of the calculation. Since the average photon number is small, the results converged rapidly
at Nmax = 8. We thus set Nmax = 16 in the following calculation. Figure 2 shows the
calculated values of ∆ as a function of the standard deviation of the phase distribution σ
for the average photon numbers µ of 0.09 and 0.01. The imbalance of the quantum coin
decreases as the standard deviation. For a small standard deviation, that is, less phase
randomized, the imbalance of the quantum coin for θ0 = π is larger than that for θ0 = 0.
The effect of the central phase difference vanishes for large standard deviation, as the phases
of the states become randomized. As seen in Fig. 2, ∆ converges to finite values for large
standard deviation. The relative errors from the asymptotic values fall below 10−2, when
the standard deviation exceeds the following values: 2.9 for µ = 0.01 and θ0 = 0, 2.6 for
µ = 0.01 and θ0 = π, 3.2 for µ = 0.09 and θ0 = 0, and 2.9 for µ = 0.09 and θ0 = π. The
values of standard deviation, 2.6, 2.9, and 3.2, correspond to the visibility of 0.034, 0.015,
and 0.006, respectively, which are estimated with Eq. (7). Therefore, target visibility values
would be 0.015 for µ = 0.01 and 0.006 for µ = 0.09 in terms of the imbalance of the quantum
coin. The asymptotic value of ∆ for µ = 0.09 is larger than that for µ = 0.01, due to the
multiple photon contribution, which increases the distinguishability between the two states.
Decoy method uses the states with different average photon numbers, called signal and
decoy. A key assumption of the decoy method is that Eve cannot distinguish the signal
pulses from the decoy. In other words, Eve can measure the photon number contained in a
pulse, but cannot measure the average photon number of an individual pulse. Then Eve’s
strategy is limited to the one that depends on the photon number of the pulse. The security
proof of the decoy method only needs to consider such limited eavesdropping strategy. Tang,
et al. [18] pointed out that phase correlation enables an unambiguous-state-discrimination
(USD) measurement to distinguish the signal from the decoy. The final key generated by
the non-phase-randomized system can be compromised by combing the USD measurement
and the PNS attack. When the phase is partially randomized, the USD measurement is no
longer possible. However, if Eve allows finite probability to obtain inconclusive results Pinc,
she can still increase the probability of the correct decision PC [27]. In the appendix, we
derive the optimum positive-operator valued measure (POVM) to discriminate the signal
state from the decoy state for partially coherent states. The results of the POVM enable to
extend the analysis presented by Tang, et al. [18].
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FIG. 2. The imbalance of the quantum coin, defined by ∆ = (1 − F (ρZ , ρX))/2, as a function of
standard deviation of phase distribution. Solid lines represent ∆ for the difference of central phase
value θ0 = 0, broken lines for θ0 = pi.
We investigate the fidelity between the signal and decoy states described by
ρ1 = e
−a2
1
∑
m,n
am+n1 e
−(m−n)2σ2/2ei(m−n)θ0√
m!n!
|m〉〈n| (13)
ρ2 = e
−a2
2
∑
m,n
am+n2 e
−(m−n)2σ2/2
√
m!n!
|m〉〈n|. (14)
Following Tang, et al. [18], we consider only the fast component of the time-bin qubits,
which carries no information on the key bit value. The density matrices ρ1 and ρ2 describe
partially phase randomized coherent states with the average photon numbers µ = 2a21 and
ν = 2a22, respectively. We calculated the fidelity numerically by truncating the number of
basis to a finite photon number Nmax = 16, as the imbalance of the quantum coin. Figure
3 shows the distinguishability defined by (1 − F (ρ1, ρ2))/2 with the fidelity of ρ1 and ρ2.
The distinguishability decreases as the phase randomization, and asymptotically reaches the
value for the completely phase randomized states. The relative discrepancy between the two
became less than 10−2 for σ > 2.5, which corresponds to the visibility of 0.044. This value
would be a target visibility in terms of the signal-decoy discrimination. The fidelity was
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FIG. 3. Distinguishability (1 − F (ρ1, ρ2))/2 between the signal and decoy states as a function of
the standard deviation of phase. Calculation was done for the partially phase randomized states of
average photon number 0.5 (signal) and 0.1 (decoy.) Solid line represents the calculated fidelity for
θ0 = pi. Dash-dot line stands for the distinguishability between the completely phase randomized
states, and dash line between coherent states with θ0 = pi.
calculated for θ0 = π, because the coherent states with the relative phase θ0 = 0 yield the
same fidelity as the completely phase randomized states. However, the coherent states still
provide an advantage to the eavesdropper to perform an individual attack as seen in the
appendix.
In this section, we have derived criteria of the phase randomness and thus the interfer-
ence visibility. The target values depend on the average photon numbers. Moreover, the
eavesdropping methods are not exhausted with those considered above, so that the target
values may be further lowered. Nevertheless, we believe that the present analysis covers a
wide range of eavesdropping, and the values estimated here should be good indications.
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III. EXPERIMENT
The phase correlation measurement system consists of the interferometer and the pulsed
light source to be tested. We employed the configuration similar to the one depicted in Fig.
1. The source was a distributed feedback (DFB) LD (NEL, NLK5C5EBKA,) which was
designed for 10-GHz direct modulation to emit optical pulses in a single longitudinal and
transversal mode. It lases around the wavelength of 1560 nm at the threshold current of 9.5
mA. The LD was driven by the combination of a 10-GHz sinusoidal current (IAC) and a DC
bias current (IDC .) The total current to the LD is expressed by IAC + IDC . The sinusoidal
current injected to the laser is expressed by
IAC =
Ipp
2
cos(2πft+ φLD), (15)
where Ipp stands for the peak-to-peak value of the sinusoidal current. The current changes
periodically with the frequency f = 10 GHz and an initial phase φLD. The sinusoidal signal
from a pulse-pattern-generator (PPG) was amplified to a fixed amplitude Vpp=4.615 V. We
estimated the peak-to-peak AC current to the LD as Ipp=92.3 mA, considering the 50-Ω
road resistance. However, in high frequency region such as 10 GHz, the emerging effects of
parasitic impedances of the LD and the circuit may reduce the current injected into the LD
active layer. To correct this effect, we measured the modulation response of the LD with
a network analyzer and a 45-GHz band-width photodetector. The resonant-like frequency
was about 12 GHz in this measurement, so that the intrinsic response of the LD affects
little the modulation response up to 10 GHz. It was found that the optical power response
of the LD decreased by about 1 dB at 10 GHz from that at 100 MHz. Since the optical
power is proportional to the injected current, we regard the reduction of the response as the
decrease of the current with the same proportion. Then the net current Inet is reduced from
the nominal value Inom by 10 log10 (Inet/Inom) = −1. The net AC current thus swung by
Ipp = 92.3× 0.794 = 73.3 mA, where 10−1/10 ≃ 0.794.
The operating condition of the LD was controlled by changing the DC bias current IDC .
We define the minimum drive current defined by Imin = −Ipp/2 + IDC , which refers to the
drive current at the bottom of the AC current. In the following, we use normalized excitation
to describe the operating condition. The normalized minimum excitation is defined by
Λ =
Imin − Ith
Ith
. (16)
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FIG. 4. Waveforms of the LD pulses. The values of the normalized minimum excitation are as
follows: (a) Λ = −1.6, (b) Λ = 0.074, (c) Λ = 0.49, and (d) Λ = 2.6.
As mentioned, the laser threshold current was Ith = 9.5 mA. When Λ > 0, the LD was
always turned on. When Λ < 0, the LD was turned off during the pulse interval. The turn-
off duration increases as the DC bias current decreases, which is obtained as a solution of
IAC + IDC = Ith with Eq. (15). When Λ < −1, the LD was reversely biased and no current
was injected at the minimum. In the present experiment, Λ = 0 and Λ = −1 correspond to
IDC=46.15 mA and IDC=36.75 mA, respectively.
We employed a commercially available asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer (AMZI)
module (Kylia, WT-MINT-M-L) to obtain interference between the adjacent pulses at 10
GHz, which was developed as a demodulator for 10-GHz differential phase shift keying
(DPSK.) The phase difference between the optical paths was modulated with a phase shifter
integrated in the AMZI module. The signal was accumulated for 256 samples and measured
with a sampling oscilloscope of 40-GHz optical band-width to observe the interference fringe.
The output of the AMZI was attenuated by an optical attenuator to avoid saturation of the
photodetector. The peak and valley intensities of the accumulated interference fringes were
recorded.
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Figure 4 shows the observed waveforms of light pulses for (a) Λ = −1.6, (b) Λ = 0.074,
(c) Λ = 0.49, and (d) Λ = 2.6, where the minimum drive current Imin was (a) below the
threshold, (b) near the threshold, (c) above the threshold, and (d) far above the threshold.
By setting the Imin close to the threshold, sharp and intense pulses were obtained as shown in
Fig. 4 (b) and (c). When the Imin was far above the threshold, the laser output reflected the
input current waveform as in Fig. 4 (d). The LD was no longer operated in the gain-switched
mode in this DC bias region.
The observed interference fringes are shown in Fig. 5. Clear interference fringe was
observed for a large excitation (Λ = 2.6) with the visibility close to unity (Θ = 0.93,)
while no clear interference fringe was observed for a small excitation (Λ = −1.6.) The
results indicate that the phases of the pulses for a gain-switched LD are still random even
at 10 GHz pulse frequency for a small minimum drive current. In Fig. 5, we plotted
the normalized values of the output signal to set the averaged value to 0.5; (Intensity) =
(Observed power)/(Averaged Power). Due to the limitation of the device, the range of phase
modulation was only slightly larger than 2π. The phase difference of the interferometer was
stable enough for the short time to obtain an interference fringe. It was not stable for days,
so that the origin of the phase difference varied as shown in Fig. 5(a)-(d.)
IV. DISCUSSION
We consider the origins of errors to examine the accuracy of the results obtained in the
experiment. First, the imperfections in the interferometer, such as fluctuation of path length,
imbalanced branch ratio of the beam splitters, polarization rotation, and depolarization will
reduce the visibility. In fact, we obtained the visibility of only 0.95 with continuous wave
(CW) light emitted from the LD excited solely by the DC current of 50 mA, which was far
above the threshold. The LD linewidth implies that the phase of the CW light should be well
conserved in the time scale of 100 ps. Therefore, we should consider the obtained visibility
was affected mainly by the imperfections in the interferometer. Assuming the imperfections
are the same throughout the experiment, we should correct the visibility by multiplying
1.05.
Second, the system noise affects the visibility estimation. In the present experiment,
we recorded the observed maximum and minimum values, which included noise. Thus, the
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FIG. 5. Interference fringes for several values of the normalized minimum excitation: (a) Λ = −1.6,
(b) Λ = 0.074, (c) Λ = 0.49, and (d) Λ = 2.6.
estimated visibility should have been overestimated. This overestimation causes no harm,
from the conservative points of view for the security certification. However, it is undesirable
for the practical use, because we may lose some amount of final key by unnecessary privacy
amplification. The effect of the noise emerges significantly for small visibilities. To obtain
better estimation, we examined the results showing low visibilities by magnifying the scale of
intensity, as shown in Fig. 6. The error bars originated mainly from the noise of the sampling
oscilloscope. The observed signal-to-noise ratio was about 17 dB, where the average intensity
was normalized to 0.5. The r.m.s. value of the noise suggests that it may be hard to measure
the visibility less than 0.02. Nevertheless, a periodic dependence on the phase difference is
seen in Fig. 6 (b). By taking the center values denoted by squares in Fig. 6, we could fit
the interference fringe with
I(ϕ) = A (1 + Θ cos(ϕ+ ϕ0)) . (17)
The result of the fitting is depicted as a thick solid line in Fig. 6. For excitation of Λ = −1.6
(a), the best fitting value for the visibility was 0.004, which reflected very weak periodic
14
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FIG. 6. Magnified view of the interference fringe. (a) Λ = −1.6 and (b) Λ = −1.2. Solid lines
denote the fitted curve. The fitted values of the visibility were 0.004 and 0.02.
dependence on the phase difference. The fitted visibility was much less the one estimated
from the maximum and minimum intensities, 0.014. For (b), Λ = −1.2, the fitted value
of the visibility was 0.022, while the estimated one was 0.030. The fit was done well, as
we consider the 95 % confidence interval of the fitting value [0.019, 0.025]. Discrepancy
between the fitted and estimated visibility decreases as the visibility increases. On the basis
of the above, we conclude that the present experimental set up can detect the visibility
down to 0.02. The effect of the noise should be reduced by using low noise front-end and by
increasing number of accumulation to obtain lower measurement limit of the visibility.
We applied the corrections discussed above. The results are summarized in Fig. 7, where
the visibility is plotted as a function of the normalized minimum excitation. Figure 7 shows
the visibility increases as the minimum excitation. It raises steeply around Λ = 0, where
the LD was always turned on. The interference fringe almost disappeared when Λ < −1,
i.e., the LD was reversely biased at the bottom. In particular, for Λ = −1.6 (IDC =30.95
mA,) the visibility was fitted to 0.004, which satisfied the strictest criterion given in sec.
II B. Though the fitted value may not be accurate as described above, the visibility satisfied
the target values 0.015 for the imbalanced coin at µ = 0.01, and 0.044 for the decoy state
discrimination. It should be noted that the interference fringe was observed even when the
LD was turned off during the pulse interval. When the minimum drive current was set in
the range −1 < Λ < 0, the light source can be no longer regarded as a phase randomized
in terms of the imbalance of the quantum coin. For example, the visibility reached 0.08 for
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FIG. 7. Visibility of the interference as a function of the normalized minimum excitation Λ. For
Λ > 0, the LD was always turned on. The LD was reversely biased at the bottom of the pulse,
when Λ < −1.
Λ = −0.76. If we care only about the laser waveform (as is common in most applications,) we
may set the bias to the value where the minimum drive current is close to the LD threshold,
because it yields the best waveform as seen in Fig. 4 (b) and (c). Unfortunately, the phases
of the pulses are correlated under this operating condition. The observed visibility was
0.534 for the case (c), where Λ = 0.074. The corresponding standard deviation of the phase
distribution is about σ = 1.12. We need to scarify more bits to guarantee the security of
final key in the privacy amplification under this operating condition.
In the following, we consider the dependence of the phase correlation on the minimum
excitation in terms of effective photon life time. As described before, if the photons survive
during the pulse interval, the phase may correlate with the previous pulses. Typical photon
life time τph of a LD cavity is several picoseconds. The effective photon lifetime can be
increased by stimulated emission, even when the excitation is insufficient for lasing. Photon
density S in the cavity will decay approximately as
dS
dt
=
(
Γg(n)− 1
τph
)
S + nsp, (18)
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where Γg(n) denotes the modal gain for the lasing mode at the carrier density n. The term
nsp represents the contribution of the spontaneous emission to the lasing mode. The photon
field is governed by the spontaneous emission, when the photon density decreases to satisfy
S ≤ nsp. Then, the phase of the light field become random.
The details of the dynamics is described with involved nonlinear coupled equations on
photon density and carrier density. Roughly speaking, though, the photon field loses the
phase information after the effective photon life time given by −(Γg(n)−1/τph)−1, as seen in
Eq. (18). Since (Γg(n)−1/τph)τph equals approximately to (I−Ith)/Ith, the effective photon
lifetime scales with the inverse of the normalized excitation. When the normalized minimum
excitation Λ exceeds zero, the effective photon life time becomes infinite to negative. Then,
the photons of previous pulses remain to contribute the phase correlation. Even when Λ
is less than zero, the photons may survive during the interval and contribute to the next
lasing. For example, at Λ = −0.33, the effective photon the time life is about three times
as large as the cavity life time at the bottom of the pulse. If we take the cavity life time
as τph = 3 ps, the effective photon lifetime increases to 10 ps. This value is comparable to
the turn-off duration of 13 ps calculated from Eq.(15). Therefore, a non-negligible number
of photons are supposed to remain under this condition. In fact, the observed visibility was
0.188, indicating some phase correlation. For small excitation satisfying Λ < −1, the LD is
reversely biased, and the effective photon life time should be equal to the cavity life time
at least in the bottom of excitation. The calculated turn-off duration is as long as 30 ps for
Λ = −1.6. Under this condition, photons should have disappeared during the pulse interval,
and the lasing phase became random, as was observed in the experiment.
We see that observed dependence of the visibility on the excitation can be explained with
the relation between the effective photon life time and the turn-off duration. A guide of
the operating condition can be summarized that the effective photon lifetime should be less
than the turn-off duration. As described above, this condition is satisfied with Λ < −1.
V. CONCLUSION
In BB84 protocol using an attenuated laser source, the secure key generation rate is
lowered if the source emits non-phase randomized optical pulses. We evaluated the effect of
the phase correlation in terms of the imbalance of the quantum coin and the discrimination
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of the decoy from the signal pulses, for the partially coherent states. We obtained criteria
for the source to be regarded as phase randomized. The target values for the visibilities were
0.006 and 0.015 in terms of the imbalance of the quantum coin at µ = 0.09 and at µ = 0.01,
and 0.044 in terms of discrimination of the decoy pulses (ν = 0.1) from the signal (µ = 0.5.)
We constructed a phase correlation test system to measure visibility of the interference fringe
between the adjacent pulses using an asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer. It enables
to evaluate the phase correlation between the laser pulses experimentally at a high clock
frequency of 10 GHz. We found that the phase correlation of the pulses from a LD depends
on the operating condition. The target values were satisfied with the gain-switched LD. The
operating condition is that the LD should be reversely biased at the bottom of the pulses,
and the turn-off duration should be longer than the effective photon lifetime. The results
indicate that QKD system clock can be increased to 10-GHz as far as the security issue
on the laser light source is concerned. In practice, a number of technical problems remain.
Among the remaining issues, the most important ones would be high speed photon detection
and post-processing.
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Appendix A: Optimal discrimination of two density matrices
We here derive the optimum discrimination of the decoy from the signal in partially
coherent states, which were given in Eq. (14). We optimized the POVM for given values
of Pinc to obtain the highest PC in discriminating the two mixed states. All the density
matrices here are real and symmetric. The POVMs Πi, i = 0, 1, 2 satisfy
Π0 +Π1 +Π2 = 1, (A1)
where Π1 and Π2 correspond to the conclusive decision that the state is ρ1 and ρ2, respec-
tively, while Π0 represents the inconclusive results. The probability of inconclusive results
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is given by
Pinc = Tr (ρΠ0) = 1− Tr (ρ(Π1 +Π2)) , (A2)
and the probability to yield a correct decision is
PC = pTr (ρ1Π1) + (1− p)Tr (ρ2Π2)
= 1− Pinc − pTr (ρ1Π2)− (1− p)Tr (ρ2Π1) , (A3)
where ρ is defined with the probability of ρ1’s occurrence p by
ρ = pρ1 + (1− p)ρ2. (A4)
We applied the iteration method developed by Fiura´sˇek and Jezˇek [27] to maximize PC (A3)
under the constraints (A1) and (A2) for a given value of Pinc using Lagrange multipliers.
The iteration was performed with symmetrized equations to keep the POVMs Hermite
and positive semi-definite. We set average photon numbers for the signal and decoy state
µ = 0.5 and ν = 0.1, respectively, and assumed the signal and decoy state appear with
the same probability (p = 1/2) for simplicity. The optimization was done for two values of
the probability of the inconclusive results: Pinc = 0.983, which refers to the probability of
the inconclusive results in the USD measurement to weak coherent states of θ0 = 0, and
Pinc = 0.712 of θ0 = π. No USD measurement for θ0 = 0 exists to satisfy Pinc = 0.712.
Figure 8 shows the probability of correct decision as a function of the standard deviation of
phase. Successful USD measurement (PC = 1) is achieved for the coherent states (σ = 0.)
The probabilities of correct decision decrease as the standard deviation of phase increasing.
The probabilities converge to the values for completely phase randomized states, when σ
exceeds about 2.5, which corresponds to the visibility of 0.044.
We observed that the numerical optimization under the condition of Pinc = 0.712 some-
times failed, in particular for large σ. It also returned the probability of correct decision
lower than that for the phase randomized states. Small errors in matrix operations may
result in such suboptimal results. Nevertheless, we found the optimized POVMs for large
σ states were almost the same as those for the phase randomized states. The optimized
POVM operators were almost diagonal in photon-number state basis. The outcome ρ1 was
obtained when the observed photon number was larger than a threshold, while the incon-
clusive result was obtained when it was smaller than the threshold. The given probability
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FIG. 8. Probability of correct decision as a function of the standard deviation of phase. State
discrimination was done for the partially phase randomized states of average photon number 0.5
and 0.1. Squares represent Pinc = 0.983, θ0 = 0, circles Pinc = 0.983, θ0 = pi, and triangles
Pinc = 0.712, θ0 = pi. Dotted line and dashed line refer to the probability of correct decision on
the phase randomized states under the conditions of Pinc = 0.983 and Pinc = 0.712, respectively.
of the inconclusive results determined the threshold photon number.
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